Afghan President's Brother

“If they let Ahmed Wali (Karzai) stay in power, it means they are not serious about governance,” said a diplomat in Kabul. [New York Times: 3/31/10]

The Afghan President's brother reportedly controls almost everything in Kandahar, the southern Afghan province that the US is poised to "clear and hold" with a large influx of troops: US, NATO and Afghan.

Ahmed Wali is the most important businessman in the area, and he has used his connection to the President well. He seizes land the Americans want to use--so they have to lease it from him; he controls armed groups that patrol the city; he pays off the Taliban to protect his lands and shipments. While the Taliban controls behind the scenes, Ahmed Wali insures that his businesses flourish. He stole the election in Kandahar for his brother. He even, reportedly, launders drug money for the Taliban, as well as for himself.

The greatest reason for the Afghan government's inability to combat the Taliban is that Afghans perceive it as irretrievably corrupt, reportedly one of the most corrupt governments in the world.

Ahmed Wali is Exhibit A.

As American troops assemble to drive the Taliban out of Kandahar, many independent advisors, from NGO's to NATO, probably including US diplomats, have urged that Ahmed Wali must go--if the US is serious about "holding," i.e. bringing in an Afghan government that wins the loyalty of the people.

But Ahmed Wali is the President's brother. He also, reportedly, has been useful to the CIA. He's one of those manipulators of power, who are able to land on their feet, regardless of who holds the whip. Ahmed Wali is going to stay.

Earlier, after the assault on Marjah, in Helmand province, McClatchy reported that the "returning" Afghan government (the governor had hardly ever set foot in Marjah) was universally despised and distrusted as corrupt.

So, this is a pattern. The US is not "serious about governance."

What does this say about the vaunted "counter-insurgency" strategy, which supposedly aims to put effective government in place to counter the insurgency, to attract Afghans' loyalty?

Despite Obama's hurried, secret visit to Karzai, when he reportedly lectured Karzai on getting rid of corruption, that's not going to happen.

The US can win all the battles--while accidentally killing more civilians--but this is no way to beat an insurgency. All we are doing is spending lives (Afghan and American) and money ($1 million per soldier/marine per year), boosting the earnings of defense contractors and making some parts of Afghanistan safe--for Chinese investment--temporarily.

The US lost Vietnam, despite winning all the battles, because its client government was hopeless: the Vietminh/Vietcong offered a better alternative.

Karzai thumbs his nose at the US, even inviting Iran's Ahmadinejad to dinner to spite us.

Afghanistan is "déjà-vue all over again." The only question is: when will the empire collapse?