Libyan Dilemma

Libya is a progressive's dilemma: the arguments in favor of intervention are humanitarian, but nothing is clear, including the goals of the intervention. The UN Security Council endorsed all actions to protect civilians--presumably from their murderous ruler--yet there is no mandate for ousting Qaddafi.

So, the mission, lobbied for by some of the revolutionaries and Sarkozy, and reluctantly agreed to by Obama and others, is vague and easily expandable. On the other hand, there is clearly a need to stop the megalomaniac from massacring his own people.

In terms of Obama's assertion of Presidential power, I deplore its arbitrary exercise, but Clinton did it and so did W. At least Obama did it multilaterally and urged the Europeans to lead. That the US has to do the initial heavy lifting demonstrates that we're the only nation stupid enough to invest in so much war-making capability. Worse is that there is no real exit agreed to, and the Libyan opposition seems to be a feckless lot that any professional military would sneer at.

I share Friedman's worry that Libya is no nation, but a collection of tribes that could murder each other for generations--just like Iraq, Afghanistan, and now Bahrain. So, will that mean that the US and its European allies will be bogged down in another civil war?

We can't afford it.

What Libya demonstrates most of all, is the danger of a budget and a war machine that's good for little else. Money drives both sides. Qaddafi reportedly didn't invest in his army (he didn't trust it), but in his loyal tribal militias and mercenary forces; he airlifted the latter from operations elsewhere. Money also drives the initial US leadership of the intervention: we have a plethora of the weapon systems needed and the skills to use them, paid for by huge Defense budgets like the approximately $750 billion allocated this year.

Trouble is what the empire buys with all this money. Probably, without international intervention, Qaddafi would have prevailed; he would have unleashed terror on his opponents. Possibly more would die than will die from the intervention. But it's not clear that the intervention will prevent Qaddafi's homicidal repression in large swathes of Libya, unless the intervening powers insert "boots on the ground."

By opposing Qaddafi with weapons, the rebels gave him the advantage. Qaddafi relies on elite militias and mercenaries: only if they defect, would armed revolutionaries gain the advantage. If, like the Egyptian rebels, Libyans continued non-violent resistance, they would have been more morally persuasive than the feckless armed volunteers, who run from tanks and artillery. If Libya were more of a nation, nonviolent protest would have united them as it did in Egypt and Tunisia.

Empires on the way down get sucked into conflicts that bankrupt them. Libya may be another one of these.