American Checkers, Persian Chess

Americans play checkers, the Persians play chess. In Middle East intrigue, Americans are outclassed. The Persians have been around for at least 5,000 years. Americans are johnnys-come-lately.

Americans in Afghanistan, as well as in Iraq, contend with Iranian influence in the governments they support. Nuri al Maliki, Iraq's PM, has long-established ties with Iran, and has recently worked out a coalition agreement with the Sadrist party, supported by Iran. What is the US to do? Maliki was supposed to be our man, nurtured and financed by the US.

Now, we find out that Hamid Karzai, Afghan President, our client in Kabul, has a chief of staff, Umar Daudzai, who is not only pro-Iranian, but Iran's conduit for illicit cash in the millions of Euros a month. His mission, it seems, is to poison Afghan-American relations.

The plot thickens: Daudzai and his friends were members of Hezb-i-Islami, a brutal, militant Islamist group led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who now lives in Iran, but has ties to the Taliban. Iran in the west, like Pakistan in the east, maintains ties and provides aid to the Taliban, as well as the government. The intelligence communities of both neighboring countries vie for influence among the Taliban, the President, and with his opponents in Afghan politics.

While Pakistan is our reluctant, or resistant ally, Iran is our rival for power in the region. Yet, both have interests in furthering Afghan stability as well as their own influence; chaos on their borders might provide opportunities to extend their power, but it also endangers their own governments.

Just as the US blundered into an age-old civil war in Iraq--between Shiite and Sunni--a game in which the Persians were deeply engaged, it has done something similar in Afghanistan. Except, the Afghan game is much more complicated. The civil war between the government we installed, and the Taliban, has been ongoing for generations, between Pathans and the peoples of the northern alliance: largely Tajik and Uzbek. Meanwhile, the nations to Afghanistan's east and west have been vying for power in Afghanistan for hundreds of years.

The British Empire marched into Afghanistan from India, and was routed. The Soviets occupied Afghanistan, but were driven out. Will the US leave more gracefully?

Afghanistan's neighbors use more subtle methods: cash bribes, safe refuges, training, and control through their intelligence services. They will outlast the crude Westerners, who think that power comes from more and better weapons. Effective weapons, as the Vietnamese and Iraqis demonstrated, can be stolen, or cobbled together from the wasteful and over-generous supplies of the invader.

Rome in its decline, abandoned its push east into Parthia: the East was too complicated. The US, also a declining empire, is baffled by the complex intricacies of the region. Which will come first: bankruptcy or defeat? Or will the US withdraw in time?